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Preface 
The USSR and the countries of Eastern Europe now face many problems re-
lating to the re-evaluation of economic and political concepts. This process 
will in turn influence energy systems (considered to be the basis for indus-
trial development) which have become a heavy burden on their economies. 
However, political and economic changes are just beginning in Eastern Eu-
rope and it is too early to discuss how the future shape of economies will be, 
or how far the tranformation from planned to market oriented eocnomies 
will go, or how soon we can expect noticeable results. One thing is certain: 
the future economic structure of Eastern European countries, including the 
USSR, should and will be less energy intensive than they were in the past and 
are still at present. This means that practically all past energy projections 
should now be considered outdated (including the most recent ones). This 
is because they were developed on the basis of old economic concepts which, 
to a large degree, are now completely unreasonable, are publicly unaccept-
able, and are overburdened with heavy industries with rigid structures, low 
economic efficiency, and high energy consumption. 
The study performed by Yury Sinyak within IIASA's Energy and the 
Environment Activity is aimed at analyzing enery efficiency in the USSR 
and at clarifying the main reasons why the energy intensity in this country 
is much higher than in many other industrialized countries. He shows the 
existence of a large energy saving potential in the Soviet economy, the uti-
lization of which could substantially improve energy efficiency and reduce 
energy demand growth. An attempt is made to evaluate future energy de-
velopments with different assumptions for efficiency improvement rates and 
economic progress, as well as primary energy restructuring to achieve C02 
reductions within the next decades. 
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Abstract-The U.S.S.R. is the largest energy producer and the second largest energy 
consumer in the world . Its share of global energy use reached above 17% in 1988. The 
Soviet energy system is characterized by low efficiency and high per capita energy 
consumption, although there are some reasons justifying the greater U.S .S.R. energy use 
per unit of product output than in other industrialized countries. The present energy-
savings potential is approximately equal to one-half of the domestic energy consumption. 
Improvements in energy efficiency at all levels of the national economy are now considered 
to be the primary goal of national energy policy for the next couple of decades. Being 
endowed with abundant natural gas resources, the U.S.S.R. will count on this energy 
source in the future to improve its energy efficiency, reduce expenses and cope with air 
pollution. After 2005-2010, stabilized primary energy consumption may be reached or 
there may even be a decline of total energy use. The U.S .S.R. could reduce C02 emissions 
by 20% by 2030 but with substantial negative impacts on GNP growth. Required 
improvements in the Soviet energy system depend on changes in energy management, 
including reduction of the role of centralized planning, decentralization and privatization 
of energy-producing facilities, energy-price reforms, reshaping of investment patterns, 
reduction in military expenditures, etc. 
U.S.S . R . ENERGY DEMAND AND SUPPLY (1960-1985) 
The U.S.S.R. energy systems 
In 1988, the U.S.S.R. production of all forms of energy reached more than 2.4 x 109 tee, 
including more than 624 x 106 tons of oil and natural gas liquids, about 750 x 109 m3 of natural 
gas (NG), and 467 x 106 tee of coal. Electricity generation amounted to 1.705 x 1012 kWh. A 
considerable contribution of 216 x 109 kWh (corresponding to more than 65 x 106 tee) was 
provided by nuclear power plants. Exports of energy supplies reached 446 x 106 tee. 
While producing around one-sixth of the world's gross national product, the U.S.S.R. is the 
second largest energy consumer in the world after the U.S .A. Its share of global energy 
demand exceeded 17% in 1988. Among Eastern European countries (CMEA), the U .S.S.R.'s 
share of the total energy demand equals 75% while its share of energy production is 85% . 
There is no reason to expect these proportions to change dramatically in the future . 
The country's growing industrial requirements for fuel and energy are expected to be met 
primarily by energy conservation and by increasing NG production , as well as by the use of 
coal and nuclear energy, although to a lesser extent than was predicted in the past because of 
difficulties with coal production and acceptability of nuclear energy. As present , the Soviet 
Union has no energy program that is designed to respond to potential global warming. It is 
possible that Soviet energy policy will be reevaluated in the near future to make adjustments 
relating to C02 minimization. 
The Soviet Union's energy system is summarized in Table 1. Vast amounts of available 
domestic energy resources (notably coal, NG, and hydropower) now determine the country's 
economic development and will continue to do so in the foreseeable future, while maintaining 
energy exports at high levels. This last statement may not apply over the long term and is 
strongly criticized within the Soviet Union. However, during the short and medium terms, the 
tReport for Contract No. 89-17 between IIASA and the Central Research Institute of the Electric Power Industry, 
Otemachi Building, 1-6-1 Otemachie, Chyoda-ku, Tokyo 100, Japan, for a study on "Collection and Evaluation of 
Energy/C02 Data for the World with Major Emphasis on CMEA Countries". 
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Energy Forecasting, Room 79-80, Vavilov Street 44/2, 117333 Moscow, U.S.S.R. 
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Table 1. Features of the U.S.S.R. energy system. 
Vast domestic energy resources (coal , NG, hydro-
power). 
Long-distance energy transportation from East to 
West. 
Limited possibilities for rapid structural changes. 
Severe climatic conditions. 
Kass urbanization with multi-story housing. 
A centralized administrative system of management. 
exports of crude oil and NG will provide the major sources of hard-currency income that is 
needed to sustain and provided perestroijka changes in the U.S.S.R. 
The vast territory and uneven energy-resource distribution make the problem of long-
distance energy transportation particularly important. The characteristics of two major parts of 
the U.S.S.R. (European and Asian) are described in Table 2. The primary cheap coal resource 
suitable for open cast mining, as well as the largest and most efficient hydropower and NG 
resources, are located in the eastern parts of the U.S.S.R. At the same time, 75-80% of the 
total current fuel and energy consumption is concentrated in the European U.S.S.R., including 
the Urals. In the future, this figure will drop but, even at the beginning of the next century, it is 
unlikely to be lower than 65-70%. 
The eastern parts of the U.S.S.R. are extremely well endowed with bituminous coal (the 
Kuznetsk and Ekibastuz basins) and brown coal (the Kansk-Achinsk basin) located in 
favorable mining and ecological environments, which make these coals fairly cheap fuels at the 
points of production. These regions also contain the abundant hydropower sources of the 
Angara-Yenisey basin. 
The world's largest NG fields have been discovered in Siberia and are currently being 
exploited. There are also considerable reserves , especially NG, in other parts of the country 
(the Pre-Caspian depression, Central Asia, the Far Eastern offshore region, Yakutiya) . 
Table 2. Comparative characteristics of the European part of the U.S.S.R. and the Eastern 
Regions (as of the early 1980s). 
Characteristic or Feature European USSR Eastern Regions 
Territory 25% 75% 
Population 78% 22% 
Population density per km 2 370 5 
Raw material resources 
Iron ore 77% 23% 
Phosphorite 65% 35% 
Wood 21% 79% 
Water 20% 80% 
Agricaltural land 39% 61% 
including arable land 68% 32% 
Energy resources 
Potential 9% 91% 
Developed 27% 73% 
Specific costs relative to 
the USSR average : 
Fuel production 125-135% 50-80% 
Electricity generat i on 105-115% 70-80% 
Construction 100% 105-125% 
Wages 100-110% 105-125% 
Social infrastructure 85-95% 105-150% 
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Table 3. Heating seasons in different countries (Ref. 1). 
Country Minimum Kean winter Degree- Ratio to 
winter temperature, days the USSR 
temperature, 
oC oc in % 
USSR -24 -3.2 4360 100 
USA -10 +4.9 2316 53 
FRG (Bremen) -11.8 +4 . 0 2530 65 
France (Paris) -9 . 4 +5.6 2456 56 
UK (London) -7.4 +8 . 1 2350 54 
Despite the fact that over the past 10-20 yr virtually all new, highly energy-intensive 
industries have been developed in Siberia, the growing energy requirements of the European 
part and the scarcity of cheap Western energy resources (virtually all coal of the European 
U.S.S.R. is produced in deep mines from thin beds) make it necessary to move ever-increasing 
amounts of fuel and energy from the eastern part of the country to the European part. Bulk 
energy transportation increased substantially over the short period from 1970 to 1985: from 
125 million tee to 975 million tee/yr. Over one-half of these resources are in the form of coal 
and of NG, the transportation of which over distances of 2500-4000 km is extremely costly. 
This is why the European U .S.S.R. has been and will remain a zone for expensive fossil fuels . 
This unique situation justifies the search for efficient ways of transporting large amounts of fuel 
and transmitting energy over large distances, which poses one of the most important scientific 
and technical problems for the U.S.S.R. energy-distribution network. 
Available cheap fuel resources, as well as the internal political situation, allow the country to 
pursue a policy of self-sufficiency, which means developing energy-intensive industries such as 
metallurgy, bulk-product chemicals, etc. This emphasis has reduced the possibilities for rapid 
and efficient structural changes promoting a reduction in the energy/GDP ratio, as could be 
happening in countries where energy-intensive industries are being vigorously phased out. 
The climatic conditions in most of the country differ considerably from those in most of 
Western Europe and the U.S.A. There are Jong, severe winters and moderate summer 
temperatures. This fact leads to a relatively large energy demand for low-temperature 
processes in space heating. There are almost twice as many space heating degree-days in the 
U.S.S.R. as in the majority of other developed countries (Table 3) . Two-thirds of the Soviet 
population lives under harsh climatic conditions, compared with 16% in the U.S.A. (Table 4). 
This is a determining factor for the high level of energy consumption in the U.S.S.R. At the 
same time, it implies a large potential for energy savings based on energy-efficient technologies 
(e .g., cogeneration, heat pumps, etc.). 
Mass urban housing construction, in the form of fairly compact housing complexes with 
multi-storied buildings, promotes large-scale centralized heating, which constitutes over 50% of 
the total low- and medium-temperature heat consumption for industry and the residential and 
commercial sectors (including 60% cogeneration for heat supply) . A centralized heat-supp1y 
system helps to improve urban air quality drastically and offers good opportunities for the use 
of a multitude of fuels. Recently, the centralized heat suppliers in some big cities have had 
problems with reliable and efficient controls, which necessitates corrections and even changes 
Table 4. Percentages of the population of the U.S.S.R. and the 
U.S.A. living in cold climates. 
Temperatures USSR USA 
-180 and below 66 16 
-18 0 to -21oc 14 11 
-21 0 to -25 oc 32 4 
-250 to -29 oc 14 1 
below -29oc 6 
Table 5. Energy consumption in percent for various sectors during the early 1980s (from Ref. 1). 
Sectors of the Na ti on al Economy 
Sector Iron and Machinery Consumer Agriculture Transpor-
Energy Steel Chemicals Forestry Construction Construction Goods and Fishery ta ti on Other 
Coal 50.7 25.4 1.0 2.1 3.0 5.8 3.7 2.5 4.4 1.4 
Crude-oil 
production 99.1 0.0 0.8 0.0 0.0 0.1 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
Crude-oil 
refining 15.9 3.7 5.2 3.4 5.2 13.3 3.4 23.8 24.2 1.9 
Natural gas 36.4 18.8 8.6 1.4 10.4 13.8 5.1 0.0 0.2 5.3 
Peat 64 .4 0.2 0.2 1.3 0.4 5.0 3.8 23 .1 0.2 1.4 
Shale 43.9 4.8 8.4 6.4 2.7 24.1 7.3 LI 0.2 1.2 
Electricity and 
heat generation 10.9 14.9 13.7 4.2 16.5 13.6 8.9 3.7 8.4 5.2 
Total 31.8 13.3 6.1 2.9 7.5 10.4 4.9 9.5 10.9 2.7 
Table 6. Cost structure in percent of the Soviet energy system (from Ref. 1). 
Energy-System Sectors 
Sectors of Crude-Oil Crude-Oil Natural Electricity and 
the National Economy Coal Production Refining Gas Peat Shale Heat Generation 
Energy 37.5 13.3 44.0 8.1 44 .7 49 .0 94 .6 
Iron and Steel 1.3 0.5 0.5 0.1 1.5 3.1 0.7 
Chemicals 2.2 1.1 2.7 1.2 1.7 17.0 0.8 
Forestry 9.0 0.2 0.3 0.2 1.9 4.7 0.1 
Machinery construction 4.4 2.5 0.7 0.4 11.2 9.4 2.8 
Construction 0.7 0.1 0.1 0.0 0.6 0.4 0.2 
Consumer goods 1.5 0.6 0.5 0.2 2.9 2.5 0.5 
Agriculture and fishery 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.1 0.0 0.0 
Transportation 38.0 64.3 36.0 89.7 34.4 13.3 
Other 5.4 17.4 15.2 0.1 1.0 0.6 0.3 
Total 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 
Total 
100.0 
100.0 
100.0 
100.0 
100.0 
100.0 
100.0 
100.0 
Total 
48 .8 
0.8 
2.0 
2.9 
2.5 
0.3 
0.8 
0.0 
33.8 
8.1 
100.0 
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in the construction of large heating systems, especially for regions with future NG-based heat 
supplies. Almost one-half of the heat is produced at low efficiencies in small boiler plants and 
individual heating systems operating on solid fuels, especially coal. 
The existing pattern of housing construction and centralized, largely electrically-driven public 
transport (suburban railway, the metro, trolley-busses, and trams) has reduced the need for 
extensive use of private cars for daily commuting to and from work. As a result, liquid-fuel 
consumption for transport is considerably lower than in other developed countries. 
For a long time, the centralized administrative system of planning resulted in increased 
conflicts between long-range prospects, presumably based on assessments of cost-effective 
energy solutions (although careful analysis of the internal and external factors often showed 
that these assessments were seldom justified), and short-term management which demanded 
the fulfillment of production and management plans by whatever means, without taking into 
consideration the economic aspects of the problem. For energy sytems, this practice took place 
under a dual energy-pricing system: (i) state prices of fuel and energy based on cost 
calculations (in the Soviet case, without including the cost of return on capital), which are in 
use for everyday transactions and payments, and (ii) marginal energy prices , which were 
derived by optimization of the state/regional energy balances and included the full cost of 
energy production, processing, transportation, and distribution, plus differential rents reflecting 
the usefulness of different energy sources. The latter pricing system was recommended for 
assessments of new energy-related technologies. Because the two price systems differed by a 
factor of at least two, it became clear that the long-range solutions were contradicting the 
short-term needs. This policy of using dual-price systems has resulted in many ineffective 
solutions for the energy-supply and demand system. These solutions are based on short-term 
considerations prevailing over long-term interests . 
Energy systems have close interconnections with other important sectors of the national 
economy. The links are not only determined by supply conditions for consumers using all types 
of fuels and energy sources and by ensuring energy development through investment but also 
by selections of feedstocks and materials and applications of the combined resources and 
facilities which involve appropriate technical solutions. 
One can get some ideas of the structure and importance of the energy systems and their links 
to other sectors by analyzing the ties. Tables 5 and 6 show the product and material cost 
distributions for energy industries relating to a number of important sectors. Ties to the energy 
systems are seen to be dominant and amount to about one-third of the volume of distributed 
products and to about one-twelfth of all material costs. They are determined by fuel 
consumption for processing of other types of fuels, energy conversion and the sectorial energy 
needs. Of the external energy ties, those with the transport sector account for about 11 % of all 
energy products in terms of cost. The transport share (Table 6) amounts to one-third of all 
energy expenditures and is relatively most important for oil and gas. Transport, agriculture and 
fisheries require nearly 50% of the oil-refining product costs . A large consumer of energy 
products, especially of coal (for coke production), gas and electricity, is metallurgy. The 
leading consumers also include chemicals, machinery and construction, the overall share of 
which equals one-quarter of the total energy costs. The share of the timber industry is mirrored 
in costs for the coal industry, which reflects the large need for timber in coal mming. 
Primary energy supply and demand 
Table 7 shows the primary energy supply and consumption in the U.S .S.R. from 1960 to 
1988. During this period, the gross energy consumption increased three-fold, while the NMP 
(national material product) increased 4.2 times. The annual NMP growth rate declined 
systematically from 5.4%/yr in 1960-1970 to 2.6% in 1980-1988. This reduction did not result 
from an increase in energy efficiency but primarily from a downturn in economic activity in the 
1980s. The share of fossil fuels during this 25-yr period decreased from 96 to 94%. 
Export of energy resources reached more than 446 million tee, compared with 60 million tee 
in 1960, and constituted almost 18% of the total energy supply. About 90% of Soviet energy 
export in 1985 was in the form of crude oil, petroleum products, and NG . More than 30% of 
the crude oil produced is exported. For coal and NG, the shares of exported resources are only 
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Table 7. Primary energy supply and consumption in 106 tee (from Ref. 2) ." 
Supply or Consumption 1960 1970 1980 1985 1988 
Supply, total 828.5 1402.5 2171.1 2439.2 2466.9 
fossil-fuel production 692.8 1221.8 1895.6 2073.1 2277.2 
hydroelectric power 23 .8 45 .5 60.l 69.l 81.86 
nuclear power 7.2 9.1 28.2 59.9 65.2 
imports 10.7 14.1 17.8 30.8 42.7 
Stock at the beginning of the year 94 .0 112.0 169.4 206.3 
Consumption , total 828.5 1402.5 2171.1 2439.2 2466.9 
Domestic consumption 670.0 1118.2 1673.3 1879.5 1985.6 
secondary energy generation 
and processing (electricity, 
heat , compressed air, etc. ) 238.6 487.2 788.9 908.2 n.a. 
direct fuel consumption 
(including losses during trans-
port and storage) 431.4 631.0 884.4 971.3 n.a. 
Export 59.8 169.5 327.8 352.2 446.5 
Stock at the end of the year 98.7 114.8 170.0 207.5 34.8 
"The conversion factor for nuclear, hydroelectric, geothermal, and other 
renewable energies has been taken to be equal to the average specific fuel 
consumed in generating electricity in thermal power plants. 
•including other renewables and fossil fuels. 
Table 8. Primary fossil-fuel production in 106 tee (from 
Ref. 2). 
Fossil Fuel 1960 1970 1980 1985 1988 
Coal 373.1 432.7 476.9 439.8 467.0 
Crude oil 211.4 502.5 862.6 851.3 892.8 
Natural gas 54.4 233.5 514.2 742.9 889.4 
Other 53.9 53.1 41.9 39.1 28.0 
Total 692.8 1221.8 1895.6 2073.l 2277.2 
8 and 12%, respectively. The import of energy resources is much less than the export and 
constitutes around 1.3-1. 7% of the energy supply for the entire period. 
The growth of the share of secondary (processed) energy in domestic energy consumption is 
an indicator of progressive shifts in the national energy balance. For the last few years, this 
share has increased from 36% in 1960 to 48.3% in 1985. For the period under consideration, 
the electricity coefficient (share of electricity in the final energy consumption) grew from 7 to 
13.1%. 
Energy losses in the transportation and distribution systems continue to remain at a high 
level (76 million tee or more than 13% in 1985, of which two-thirds represent losses in the 
electricity and heat-supply grids: 43.6 and 7.7 million tee, respectively). 
Major changes have occurred in the restructuring of domestic fossil fuel production (Table 
8). The total level of fossil-fuel production increased from 690 million tee in 1960 to 
2100 million tee in 1985. At the same time, the share of coal declined from 54 to 21 %, the 
share of oil increased from 30.5 to 41.1% and NG from a mere 7.8 to 35%. Natural gas 
production is now almost equal that of crude oil; NG clearly exceeds all other sources in 
domestic energy consumption. 
An overview of domestic primary energy consumption by sectors of the economy is shown in 
Table 9. The structure of energy consumption by sector reflects progressive changes in the 
Table 9. Primary energy consumption by sectors in 106 tee (from 
Ref. 2) . 
Sector 1960 1970 1980 1985 
Total domestic consumption 670.0 1118.2 1673.3 1879.5 
Industry 390.6 661.6 900.3 957.4 
Construction 12.3 27.8 41.9 53.4 
Transportation 60.0 121.0 206.7 241.5 
Agriculture 34.9 63.6 118.7 131.3 
Residential and commercial 172.2 244.2 405.7 490.9 
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energy system. The share of the energy-intensive industrial sector declined from 58.3 to 51 % , 
the transportation sector increased from 9 to 13% and the remaining three sectors (agriculture, 
construction, and the residential/commerical sectors) remained nearly constant. These moder-
ate shifts in the distribution of energy have followed small improvements in the energy /NMP 
ratio during the last 25-30 yr. Achievements in reducing the energy intensity of the Soviet 
economy could have been far greater if the shifts in economic structure had been more 
pronounced. 
Final energy consumption 
The final energy consumption reflects the quality of the energy resources delivered to 
end-users. It follows from Table 10 that the share of processed energy (electricity and low 
temperature heat) rose from 30.8% in 1980 to almost 46% in 1985. At the same time, the 
growth rate of electricity use increased only from 9.2 to 13.0%, which suggests that modest 
technological changes in the economy did not increase productivity and efficiency significantly. 
Losses in energy processing were reduced from 42% in 1960 to 28% in 1985, demonstrating 
good progress in the energy-conversion sectors and contributing to the growth of overall 
efficiency. 
Seventy-five percent of final energy consumption occurs for material production and the rest 
in the residential and commercial sectors. This proportion seems likely to stabilize in the near 
future. Table 11 shows the final energy consumption divided according to end-use processes. 
During the last 25 yr, large changes have taken place in the share of motive power (from 17% 
in 1960 to 23% in 1985) and there has been a reduction in the share of high-temperature heat 
(from 28 to 21 % ). These have contributed to an increase in overall energy efficiency, first 
because the use of electricity or petroleum products in motive processes takes place with higher 
efficiency than for steam drive and, secondly, because the high-temperature heat produced by 
fossil fuel burning shows very low energy efficiency. In the future, these trends are likely to 
continue. With further growth in the use of low and medium temperature heat, improvements 
will occur in the overall energy efficiency. 
Table 10. Final energy consumption and applications in 106 tee . 
Application 1960 1970 1980 1985 
Total final energy 390.2 753.3 1144.5 1350.7 
Direct fossil fuels, including motor fuel 269.9 457.0 630.2 736.7 
Electricity 35.9 90.4 156.8 186.4 
Low and medium heat• 84.4 205.9 357.5 427.6 
"The heat-generation units are included in the category of energy-conversion 
equipment with their losses treated as energy losses in fuel processing and 
conversion . 
Table 11. Final energy consumption for different processes in percent (from 
Ref. 4) . 
Process 1960 1970 1980 1985 
Lighting 0.07 0.08 0.11 0.14 
Electrochemical and 
electrophysical processes 0.45 0.60 0.90 0.90 
Motive power 16.60 18.60 22 .00 22.50 
High-temperature heat 28.30 25.50 21.60 20.50 
Low- and medium-temperature beat 
(steam and bot water) 54.40 55.20 55.40 56.00 
Total final consumption 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 
Electricity generation and heat supply 
Since the beginning of Soviet history, electrification of the national economy has been 
considered to be a vital part of industrialization and the resolution of social problems. For 
many years , the growth rate of electricity consumption exceeded those of fossil-fuel 
consumption and of the NMP. For example, from 1960 to 1985, the average growth rate of 
electricity consumption was 6.9%/yr as compared with a NMP-growth rate of 5.5% and a total 
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Table 12. Electricity generation by power-plant type in 
109 kWh (from Refs. 3-5). 
Power Plant 1960 1970 1980 1985 1988 
Thermal 241 612.9 1037.0 1154.l 1258.0 
Nuclear - 4.0 72.9 167.4 216.0 
Hydro and other 51 124.0 184.0 222.7 231.0 
Total 292 740.9 1293.9 1544.2 1705.0 
primary energy-consumption growth rate of 4.2%. In spite of the importance of electricity in 
reconstruction and technological progress, the development of the electricity sector (especially 
in the 1970s and 1980s) has been associated with difficulties and tensions. As an example of the 
difficult situation in this sector, it should suffice to mention that since the 1960s, investments in 
the electricity sector have remained practically unchanged despite a manifold increase in 
installed capacity and the increasing length of the electricity-transportation grid. As a result, a 
number of obsolete installations are still in use. The Chernobyl accident further slowed the 
pace of reconstruction in the electricity sector. Not until the current 5-yr plan have investments 
been increased. It will take many years to improve the technical standard in the electricity 
sector. 
Meanwhile, despite some difficulties, the Soviet electricity sector has achieved remarkable 
success over the last 30 yr (Table 12) during which time generation of electricity increased 5.3 
times. The structure of electricity generation by primary energy changed slightly. While in 
1960, 78% of electricity was produced in thermal power plants, in the mid-1980s, their share 
declined to 75%. Over the same period, the share of hydroelectricity also declined from 17 to 
14%. The gap was filled with nuclear electricity the input of which in total electricity generation 
reached almost 11 % in 1985. 
More pronounced changes were seen in the mix of electricity generation from primary 
energy sources (Table 13). Over a period of 15 yr (1970-1985) the share of solid fuel in 
electricity generation dropped from more than 40% to less than 25%. The share of fuel oil, 
after some increase in the 1970s up to 28%, was reduced to 16%. The share of natural gas took 
off suddenly in the early 1980s from less than 20% to more than one-third. Nuclear electricity 
also grew steadily in the first part of the 1980s, reaching almost 11 % in the mid-1980s. The 
share of hydroelectric power has been reduced from 20% to less than 15%. 
The capacity factor for the whole electricity sector has improved steadily (Table 14), mainly 
due to the introduction of base-load nuclear energy with a higher level of capacity utilization. 
At the same time, a decline in the capacity factor for fossil fuel power plants and hydroelectric 
Table 13. Electricity generation by pri-
mary energy sources in percent (from 
Refs. 6, 7). 
Fuel Type 1970 1980 1985 
Coal 41.4 32.l 24.7° 
Fuel oil 17.8 28.0 16.1° 
Natural gas 19.3 19.3 34.0° 
Peat, wood, etc. 2.5 0.8 -
Nuclear 0.5 4.5 10.8 
Hydro 18.5 15.3 14.4 
Total 100.0 100.0 100.0 
al987. 
Table 14. Capacity factors and fuel efficiencies for electricity generation and 
heat supply (from Refs. 2, 3) . 
-· 
Capacity Factors and Fuel Efficiencies 1960 1970 1980 1985 1988 
Capacity factors 0.54 0.54 0.57 0.58 0.58 
Thermal 0.67 0.62 0.65 0.65 0.64 
Hydro 0.44 0.47 0.42 0.41 0.42 
Nuclear n.a. 0.44 0.67 0.70 0.70 
Specific-fuel consumption 
Electricity, g.c.e/kWh 468 367 328 326 325.0 
Heat supply, kg. c.e./Gcal 181.2 175.7 173.0 172.9 172.9 
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Table 15. Electricity consumption by sectors in 109 kWh (from 
Refs . 2, 3). 
Sector 1960 1970 1980 1985 1988 
Industry 207.5 493.2 778.3 899.9 980.7 
Transportation 17.6 49.6 97.4 113.7 132.7 
Agriculture 10.0 38.6 110.9 145.7 166.8 
Residential 
and Commercial 39.4 96.0 181.3 222.2 245.9 
Grid losses 17.8 58.3 106.9 133.7 139.9 
Export 0.03 5.2 19.l 28 .9 39.0 
Total 292.3 740.9 1293.9 1544.1 1705.0 
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stations was registered, due mainly to an increasingly uneven load curve. At the same time, a 
lower water supply resulted in a decline of hydroelectricity and less utilization of hydroelectric 
stations. 
Shifts in fossil-fuel consumption for electricity generation toward heating oil and NG caused 
a reduction in specific fuel consumption of 30% during the period 1960-1985. The results 
would have been more impressive if there had not been the need to continue the use of 
out-of-date equipment with low energy efficiency. 
The consumption of electricity almost equals generation, since the export of electricity , while 
increasing, has not yet exceeded 2% (Table 15). We note a decline in the industrial share from 
71 % in 1960 to 59% in 1985. During the same period, agricultural consumption increased from 
3.4 to about 10%. The shares of the transportation and residential/commercial sectors changed 
little, although the absolute levels of electricity consumption increased substantially. 
The penetration of electricity into all sectors of the Soviet economy largely accounts for the 
technological and social progress achieved during the last decades. Unfortunately, this success 
has not been adequately followed by organizational and institutional changes. It has been 
sufficient to prevent the economic difficulties the Soviet economy now faces . 
In the U.S.S .R ., over 35% of the primary energy resources are used for the generation of 
low-temperature heat , usually produced in boilers of various types, waste-heat installations, 
and small household heating devices (ranging from old Russian ovens used in rural areas for 
space heating and cooking to new electric devices such as heat pumps or radiative heaters). In 
spite of the fact that more than one-third of domestic energy is consumed in the heat-supply 
sector, the statistics for heat generation and utilization are incomplete and inconsistent . 
Sources often contain contradictory information. We have tried to put the information in order 
as far as possible. Nevertheless, we do not claim that the data on heat supply are now 
completely correct and consistent. 
The heating demands of the Soviet economy increased from 910 million Gcal in 1960 to 
3430 million Gcal in 1985 (Table 16) . These demands have been covered by two different 
Table 16. Low-temperature heat supplies as steam and hot water in 106 Gcal 
(from Ref. 8 and author's assessments). 
Heat Supplies and Sources 1960 1970 1980 1985 
Steam and hot water 590 1440 2500 2990 
Direct fuel use 
(household devices and small boilers )0 320 460 450 440 
Total heat supplies 910 1900 2950 3430 
Sources of heat supplies 
Centralized systems 300 810 1580 2030 
Cogen era ti on 270 700 1150 1480 
Boiler housesb 30 110 430 550 
Decentralized systems 610 1090 1370 1400 
Small collective 
heating installations 275 590 810 810 
Waste-beat boilers 15 40 110 150 
Household devices 320 460 450 440 
"Without cooking. 
bHeat capacity > 50 Gcal/h . 
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means: (i) steam and hot water (the share of which rose from 65 to 87% during the period 
under consideration) and (ii) radiative heat produced by the direct use of fuel in special 
installations of small dimensions, mainly in rural areas. This second form is decreasing steadily. 
At the same time, electric heating devices are becoming more important. While the 
contribution of these heating devices is not yet more than a couple of percent, the prospects are 
good as wider use is made of heat pumps for space heating, air conditioning, and hot water, 
both in centralized and decentralized systems. In the future, the share of direct fuel use will 
decline and the share of steam and hot water will also be reduced by increasing use of 
electricity. 
A second pronounced trend in the Soviet heat-supply system is growth in the share of 
centralized systems from 33% in 1960 to 59% in 1985. At the present time, the concept of 
centralizing the heat supply further by using large heat-generating facilities (cogeneration 
power plants or large boiler stations) is being widely criticized because of the low reliability of 
these systems and associated high heat losses. A new concept of combined heat and electricity 
generation based on NG-fired gas turbines with waste-heat boilers appears attractive from 
economic, ecological, and energy-efficiency points of view. 
Most of the heat produced in centralized systems comes from cogeneration plants, the output 
of which increased from 270 to 1480 million Gcal. In spite of the fact that the share of 
cogeneration heat production declined from 90% in 1960 to 73% in 1985, cogeneration remains 
a principal means of technological progress in this field. Cogeneration is energy-efficient (for 
example, in the early 1980s, the specific fossil-fuel consumption in condensed thermal power 
plants equalled 356 g/kWh as compared to only 265 g/kWh in cogeneration plants). The 
significant share of cogeneration electricity (almost one-third of all electricity generated in the 
U.S.S.R.) has made it possible to achieve progress in energy savings in electricity generation 
(see Table 14). Cogeneration facilities comprise almost 40% of the total installed capacity of 
thermal power plants. However, their contribution to electricity generation equals only 25%. 
This means that the utilization of cogeneration capacities needs to be improved through better 
adjustments of electricity and heat supply-and-demand (seasonal/weekly/daily) curves. 
The structure of the centralized heat-generating facilities is given in Table 17. More than 
50% of the heat produced is in the form of hot water and more than 70% is produced by small 
heat generators with a capacity less than 20 Gcal/h. Until recently, increased generating 
capacity was considered to be a means for improving the economic and energy efficiencies, but 
this concept is now being questioned by many scientists who recommend wider use of small and 
medium-sized devices equipped with NG-fired gas turbines and waste-heat boilers that provide 
higher reliability and improved efficiency for both costs and energy. 
The growth of the centralized heat-supply systems has been followed by a steady increase in 
the lengths of the heat-supply mains, which now equal about 30,000 km. As the lengths of the 
heat-supply mains have been increased, so have their damage rates and this fact has lowered 
the reliability of heat supply and become a real problem in many cities of the Soviet Union. 
Direct fuel use for low temperature heat supply continues in the residential and commercial 
sectors of rural areas, as well as in small agricultural enterprises. It is interesting to analyze the 
use of steam and hot water. Table 18 shows data on consumption in the form of steam and hot 
Table 17. Heating values of centralized heat-generation facilities as of 1985 (from Ref. 9) . 
Facility Tota.l < 20 Gca.l/hr 20-50 Gca.l/hr > 50 Gcal/hr 
Tota.l number of boiler houses, 103 437.6 429.5 5.8 2.3 
Number of stea.m boilers, J03 366.0 324.4 34 .5 7.1 
Tota.l heat supply from stea.m 
boilers in J03 Gca.l/hr 757.4 506.8 124.7 126.0 
Number of water heaters, 103 617.I 605.3 7.6 3.9 
Total heat supply from water 
boilers, in 103 Gcal/hr 826.0 606.5 57.5 162.0 
Net heat supply, in J06 Gcal 1657.3 9J0.4 308.5 438.4 
Fuel consumption , in 106 tee 290.7 165.1 52.3 73 .3 
Specific fuel consumption , 
kg ce/Gca.l 175.4 181.4 169.7 167.J 
U.S.S.R.: energy efficiency and prospects 
Table 18. Steam and hot water heat supplies by sectors in 
106 Gcal (from Ref. 8). 
Sectors 1960 1970 1980 1985 
Industry 350 711 1386 1533 
Construction 5 25 41 44 
Transportation - 4 42 47 
Agriculture - II 57 86 
Commercial 35 189 286 313 
Residential 80 233 335 584 
Others 70 110 122 127 
Grid losses 50 157 231 256 
3 cogeneration 46 49 46 46 
Total district heating 590 1440 2500 2990 
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water. Industry remains the largest consumer of low-temperature heat of this kind, although its 
share declined from almost 60% in 1960 to 51 % in 1985. The residential/commercial share 
increased from 19 to 30% during the same time period. There has been improvement in the 
living standards in the cities, where decentralized heat-supply systems based on direct fuel use 
were steadily replaced by centralize systems for space heating and hot-water preparation. Heat 
losses in the supply grid have remained constant at about 8.5% . The share of total grid losses is 
greater according to some. 
Direct fuel use for low-temperature heat production is summarized in Table 19. The share of 
direct fuel use in total heat supply declined from 35% in 1960 to only 13% in 1985 and is still 
declining. In 1960, two-thirds of direct fuel use came from "other" sources, i.e., the self-supply 
by the population through wood gathering, refuse-burning, etc. By the end of the 1980s, the 
share of this source had been reduced to 9%. The remaining direct fuel use (mainly in rural 
areas and small settlements) was covered by the state fuel supply system and was divided 
almost equally between coal and NG or LPG. The share of coal is expected to decline in the 
future as the share of NG rises rapidly, especially in rural areas. 
Table 19. Approximate structure of the direct fuel-use 
system in small heat-supply generators in percent. 
Source 1960 1970 1980 1985 
Coal 29.0 52.0 46.0 44.0 
Petroleum products - - 14.0 12.0 
Natural gas 4.5 13.5 25 .0 35.0 
Other 66.5 34.5 15.0 9.0 
Total 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 
Energy savings and overall energy efficiency 
Primary energy saving reflects the efficiency of national efforts in energy conservation. There 
are direct savings as the result of improvements in efficiency, changes in fossil-fuel mix and 
shifts in industrial production. There are also indirect energy savings as a result of fossil-fuel 
replacement by nuclear and renewable energy sources. Table 20 shows that the fraction of 
indirect savings increased from 18% in 1960 to 38% in 1985. What we call direct energy-saving 
measures declined. Since energy conservation was not seriously pursued in the 1970s, direct 
Table 20. Primary energy savings in 106 tee achieved for 
various time periods. 
Energy Source 1970- 1975- 1980-
1975 1980 1985 
Fossil fuels 53.7 29.0 40.0 
Electricity and heat 41.5 37.5 37.9 
Motor fuels 15.0 14.2 14.7 
Replaced by nuclear and 
hydroelectric energy 24 .8 44.3 57.4 
Total primary energy savings 135.0 125.0 150.0 
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Table 21. Direct energy savings by sector. 
Sector 1960-65 1965-70 1970-75 1975-80 1980-85 
Industry (%)• 49 .7 61 63.8 71.3 67.6 
Transportation (%) 47.7 36 28.9 18.5 21.0 
Agriculture(%) - - 4 4 3 
Residential 
and commercial (%) 3 3 3.3 6.2 8.4 
Overall energy efficiency, 
in% 32 36 38 40 42 
Total direct savings 
in 106 tee 167 130 90 81 93 
"Including the energy supply sectors. 
energy savings declined from 110 miliion tee in 1970-1975 to only 80 million tee in 1975-1980. 
The situation improved slightly in the 1980s and reached more than 90 million tee in the first 
5-yr period of the 1980s. 
Table 21 shows the direct energy savings by sector. In the 1950s, a large portion of the direct 
energy savings occurred in the transportation sector where low-efficiency stream drives in the 
railways were phased out and replaced with diesel or electric engines. This process was 
practically completed by the early 1980s. As a result the efficiency of energy-saving measures 
dropped. Major achievements in energy savings occurred in industrial processes, which have a 
large remaining potential for improvements and energy savings. A modest contribution to 
energy savings has been made in the residential and commercial sector>. Considerable savings 
potential remains. 
According to some assessments , the overall energy efficiency of the Soviet energy system 
changed from 32% in 1960 to 42% in 1985. This means that in spite of many malfunctions in 
the system, the overall energy efficiency remains at a rather high level. Unfortunately, the 
overall energy efficiency reflects only one side of the national economy and has not been 
sufficient to reduce the energy intensity of the economy to desired levels . An inefficient 
productive system connected with an inadequate product-mix structure are the main potentials 
for improvements of the national economic situation, as well as the overall energy efficiency. 
Rough assessments show that of 58% of the overall primary energy losses in the U.S.S.R., 
22% occur in extraction, separation, transportation, and conversion of the primary energy 
resources, including approximately 12% of energy losses at the electric power plants. The 
remaining 38% of losses occur at the end-use locations. t 
ENERGY/NATIONAL MATERIAL PRODUCT AND VALUE ADDED RATIOS 
Energy supplies require considerable financial resources and both delivery rates and 
priorities must be properly selected.:j: A properly selected energy-development strategy is 
needed for accelerated economic development. 
During the period 1960-1985, the U .S.S.R. national material product (NMP) or national 
income increased by a factor of 3.83 (Table 22) as compared to an increase in primary energy 
consumption by a factor of 2.8. If we consider the NMP growth rates over the 10-yr period 
from 1960 to 1970, we see that the Soviet economic system growth rate declined steadily: 
6.74% for 1960-1970, 4.77% for 1971-1980, and 4.59% for 1981-1985. The NMP structure 
also changed during this period. The industrial share, which constituted almost 50% of the 
NMP in the early 1960s, decreased to 45% in the mid-1980s. In spite of efforts undertaken over 
the past years to improve the situation in the agricultural sector, its share dropped from 25 to 
19% in 1985 (for the same period, agricultural production increased three-fold). 
tRecalculated from Ref. 10. 
~From 1975 to 1988, the industrial output in the U.S.S.R. increased by 182% while energy production increased by 
only 155%. At the same time, capital investments in the energy sector increased from 12.7 to 45.l billion rbl / yr, 
with the direct energy sector share in total investments increasing from 9.9 to almost 25% . 
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Table 22. Value added per sector in 109 rbl (1985° or 1988•) for the 
national material products (NMP) (from Refs . 2, 3) . 
Sector 1960" 1970" 1980" 1985" 1988° 
Industry 73.3 135.0 198.0 217.7 269.5 
Construction 14.3 30.9 54.7 63.2 80.6 
Transportation 5.6 17.3 31.8 35.0 38.7 
Agriculture 37.8 70.9 90.8 103.0 143.3 
Others 20.0 45.9 112.7 147.1 98.7 
Total 151.0 300.0 488.1 566.0 630.8 
Table 23. Energy and electricity /value added ratios by sector. 
Sector 1960 1970 1980 1985 
Primary energy (tce/10, rbl) 
Industry 5.3 4.90 4.55 4.40 
Construction 0.9 0.90 0.76 0.84 
Transportation 10.7 7.00 6.50 6.90 
Agriculture 0.7 0.90 1.31 I 1.27 
Electricity (kWh/rbl) 
Industry 2.83 3.65 3.93 4.13 
Transportation 3.14 2.87 3.06 3.25 
Agriculture 0.26 0.54 1.22 1.41 
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The energy intensity of the different economic sectors also changed during this same time 
period (Table 23): energy/value added ratios in industry and transport decreased almost by a 
factor of 1.5 (from 5.2 to 3.6 and 10.7 to 7.0tce/103 rbl, respectively). In the agricultural 
sector, the energy intensity increased at first to 1.8 tce/103 rbl until 1980 and then dropped back 
to 1.2 tce/103 in 1985. These improvements in energy intensities are responsible for the 
reduction in the total energy/NMP ratio from 4.44 to 3.24 tce/103 rbl (a 16% decrease 
compared to 1970), while the energy/NMP elasticity ratio decreased from 0.78 in the 1970s to 
0.51 in the early 1980s. 
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Fig. 1. The energy to value added ratio in kgce/rbl. 16 Ratio structure: 1-<lirect fuel use; 
2--electricity; 3---motor fuel; 4-heat; 5-feedstocks and materials. Energy savings due to : 
6-restructing the national economy; 7-improving energy efficiency; S-technological progress; 
9--waste energy use . 
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Table 24. Percentage changes in the energy/NMP ratio. 
Energy-supply sources 
Direct fuel user 
Motor fuels 
Electricity 
Low temperature heat 
Raw materials and feedstocks 
1960 
56 
13 
25 
11 
5 
1985 
35 
12 
25 
19 
9 
Strong electricity-consumption growth is common to all developed nations. The U .S.S.R. 
electricity/NMP ratio grew in the 1980s from 1.94 to 2.76 kWh/rbl but then declined to 
2.62 kWh/rbl by 1985. The 1985 electricity/NMP ratio was slightly above the 1970 level. 
Considering the ratio of electricity to value added by sector, we find that the electricity 
intensity in the industrial sector increased by 20% and almost five-fold in the agricultural 
sector. Figure 1 illustrates the different forms of final energy input compared to the reduction 
in national energy intensity. The structure of the energy/NMP ratio changed over the period 
1960-1985 as is shown in Table 24. We note a reduction of direct fuel use per NMP unit by 
50%, motor fuels by 38% and electricity by 27%. At the same time low temperature heat 
consumption increased by 20% and that of raw materials and feedstocks by 67%. 
Table 25 shows the results of energy-conservation efforts in the U.S.S.R. and other 
industrialized countries in the 1970s and early 1980s. The absolute levels of the ratios 
energy/NMP depends strongly on the exchange rates. Nevertheless, it is clear that Soviet 
conservation policy was less effective than that of some Western countries. Since the early 
1970s, energy/NMP in the U.S.S.R. decreased only by 16% to 1985, as compared to 21 % on 
the average for the IEA countries, 31 % for Japan, and 23% for the U.S. Such a modest success 
in the overall reduction of the U.S.S.R. energy/NMP ratio can be explained as follows: 
(i) abundance of domestic fossil-fuel resources and a secure energy supply have resulted in late 
awareness of the importance of energy conservation; (ii) over the years, the policy of economic 
independence from the West has resulted in slow structural changes, with continuously 
increasing shares of the energy-intensive sectors and industries; (iii) low energy prices did not 
stimulate energy conservation; (iv) the existing economic system, in which the energy ministries 
play a leading role in shaping the economy, concentrated on investments in the energy-
production sectors instead of energy savings for end-users; (v) there is low energy efficiency for 
domestic energy generation and for consuming equipment. 
In order to understand the changes in energy utilization better, it is of interest to analyze the 
energy/VA ratios in material production (Table 26). For the period under consideration, the 
energy intensity of material production decreased by 30% with decreases in the energy-
intensive sectors: iron and steel by 38%, non-ferrous metals by 43%, and chemical products by 
52%. Energy savings in the transportation sectors were even greater (by 68% ). The energy 
intensity grew only in the agricultural sector (by 25% ). This reduction is primarily explained by 
changes in the final energy structure, mainly increases in the share of electricity and 
Table 25. Energy/GNP ratios for different countries. 
Percent Reduction" 
Country 1985b in 1985 compared to 
1973 1979 
USSR 3.32 14 3 
USA 0.61 23 16 
Ja.pa.n 0.29 31 22 
FRG 0.31 18 14 
UK 0.35 20 13 
Italy 0.33 20 13 
Average of !EA countries 0.45 21 15 
"For the U.S.S.R., the years 1970 and 1980. 
bFor the U.S.S.R. in tce/103 rbl; for other countries, in 
tce/1D3 U.S.$ (1980). 
Table 26. Energy /value added ratios for material production in tee/ I<J3 rbl. 
1960 
Industry Total 
Steam and Direct Motor Primary Steam and 
Electricity Hot Water Fuel Fuel Energy Electricity Hot Water 
Iron and steel 3.33 2.17 20.05 0.86 26.41 3.57 1.75 
Nonferrous metals 7.81 2.50 1.75 0.75 12.94 4.49 1.35 
Fuel production 1.93 2.68 1.89 0.45 6.94 1.50 1.41 
Electricity generation 10.94 1.00 . - 11.94 9.42 1.12 
Chemicals 4.56 6.72 0.28 0.39 15.721 2.64 4.59 
Machinery 0.66 0.77 0.24 0.11 1.74 0.46 0.61 
Lumber and paper 0.35 0.58 - 0.30 1.23 0.75 1.53 
Building materials 0.98 0.78 4.16 0.47 6.39 1.08 1.38 
Textile 0.33 0.50 - - 2.461 0.32 0.42 
Food 0.57 1.71 0.50 1.03 5.341 0.51 1.76 
Total industry 1.29 1.19 2.53 0.32 5.33 1.42 1.21 
Construction 0.29 0.21 O.o2 0.21 0.86 0.30 0.20 
Transportation 1.36 0.32 9.61 11.11 22.40 1.25 1.22 
Agriculture 0.09 - 0.11 0.71 0.92 0.35 0.06 
Total Material 
Production 0.89 0.70 1.45 0.79 4.1 7 0.94 0.68 
0 Without fuel consumption for electricity generation. 
•including fuel consumption as raw material and for non-energy uses. 
1985 
Direct Motor 
Fuel Fuel 
11.04 0.19 
1.33 0.21 
3.07 0.15 
. 
-
0.30 0.06 
0.17 O.o2 
0.17 0.36 
3.73 0.32 
0.03 -
0.29 0.42 
0.89 0.11 
0.11 0.25 
1.77 3.00 
0.24 0.50 
0.89 0.42 
Total 
Primary 
Energy 
16.56 
7.37 
6.12 
10.54 
7.50 
1.26 
2.83 
6.50 
0.78 
2.98 
3.63 
0.86 
7.24 
1.15 
2.93 
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Table 27. Iron and steel losses in metal processing (from Ref. 9). 
Processes 1970 1980 1985 
Percent of waste in iron and 
steel production 29 28 28 
Steel consumption in 
machinery (106 tons) 59.9 82.2 89.1 
Percentage of losses during 
metal processing 22 22 21 
Percentage of percentage losses 
in metal shaving 48 44 44 
Total steel production (10" tons) 116 148 155 
low-temperature heat which are characterized by greater utilization efficiency (for electricity) 
and production (for heat). The shares for both energy carriers increased: iron and steel 
production from 21 % in 1960 to over 32% in 1985; chemical production from 72 to 92%, 
transportation from 6 to 17%, and agriculture from 10 to 30%, respectively . For total material 
production the fraction of processed energy sources increased from 38% in 1960 to 55% in 
1985. 
It is evident that all of these measures were not enough to achieve the level of energy 
conservation in the U.S.S.R . that was reached in the developed countries of the West. But this 
is only one part of the problem. We must analyze the major difficulties of the Soviet economy 
which led to small reductions of the energy intensity over the past years. 
During the past few years , the Soviet economy had a very high level of material intensity , 
which decreased from 1975 to 1987 by only 5%, which is less than for the Western countries. 
For comparison, in the European Community, the iron and steel capacity (an energy-intensive 
sector) had the following reductions: cast iron, 13% (from 137 million tons in 1975 to 
119 million tons in 1988) ; steel, 12% (from 190 to 167 million tons); hot-rolled stock , 14% 
(from 143 to 123 million tons). The share of the most progressive technology (continuous steel 
casting) rose from 15.3% of the total output in 1975 to 76% in 1986 (Ref. 11) . During almost 
the same time period, the reduction of the oil-refinery output in Western Europe reached 30% 
(from 20.8 in 1976 to 14.4 million bbl/day in 1986). t Unfortunately , lessons of the oil crises have 
not been taken into account in the U.S.S.R. As a result, the Soviet economy remains 
technologically backward and material wasteful. An example of the Soviet industry's high 
material losses is provided by ferrous-metal utilization and is given in Table 27. The share of 
metal losses in steel production is very high (28%) and did not decline during the last few 
years. Very high losses (almost one-fifth) also occur in machinery production, nearly one-half 
of which is due to metal shaving. Both of the values indicate the low technological levels in 
both metal production and treatment, which reflect the high levels of lost energy indirectly. 
The high energy intensity in the Soviet economy may also be explained by the low efficiency 
and quality of the machinery and processes in use . Only 16% of the total machinery stock 
(including energy conversion and end use) are on a par with world standards and one-quarter 
to one-third are far below national standards, which are often far behind world standards. 
Especially poor are the iron and steel and chemical-production industries , which are the most 
energy-intensive sectors. More than 40% of the machines and processes are 10 years or more 
old . Their utilization during the last 20 yr was 21 % in the iron and steel industry and over 16% 
in the energy sector and chemical production. Even more serious is the situation of obsolete 
machinery and processes: over one-fifth of the machinery used in the iron and steel industry 
and in chemicals production are 100% obsolete . All of these factors play a decisive role in 
explaining the low energy efficiency of the Soviet energy system. The situation will hardly 
change over the next few years because a change requires high investments in modernization 
and restructure of the Soviet economy, which is presently lacking because of low past NMP 
growth and the priority given to resolution of social problems which have recently reached 
critical dimensions . 
t Although the refinery load factor increased but the total refinery output for Western Europe was 24% lower than at 
the pre-1973 period (see Ref. 12) . 
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Table 28. Equipment performance in percent as of 1 April 1986 (from Ref. 9). 
Best Out-of-date 
Equipment World National and 
Standard Standard Obsolete 
Energy equipment 
Stearn boilers 10.5 52.9 36.6 
Waste-heat boilers 5.7 48.5 45 .8 
Steam turbines 2.6 36.6 60.8 
Gas turbines 5.2 76.3 18.5 
Hydro turbines 2.0 21.5 76.5 
Compensating capacities 11.7 42 .3 46.0 
Diesel engines (w/o auto) 6.7 52.3 41.0 
Electrothermal equipment 
Electric arc furnaces 4.9 38.6 56.5 
Metal treating furnaces 7.8 47.4 44.8 
Induction melting and heating equipment 9.8 5!.l 39.l 
High frequency industrial equipment 9.6 59.9 30.5 
Electric welding equipment 
Open-arc welding machines 12.2 50.0 37.8 
Contact welding machines 7.1 44 .7 48 .2 
Special welding machines 9.8 50.7 39.5 
Table 29. Useful energy/NMP ratio in Gcal/1D3 rbl (from Ref. 10). 
1960 1970 1980 1985 
Material production 8.0 8.2 8.5 8.5 
Non-productive sectors 3.7 3.2 2.9 2.9 
Total 11.7 11.5 11.4 11.4 
The situation is even worse with outdated and obsolete energy equipment (Table 28). In 
total, the share of modern equipment does not exceed 10% , while the share of outdated and 
obsolete equipment is 50% . This situation does not allow improvements in energy efficiency 
and is the reason for the high energy/NMP ratio in the U.S.S.R . 
The Jack of real progress in improving the energy efficiency and reducing the energy intensity 
is shown in Table 29. As can be seen, the useful energy consumption per NMP unit has 
remained practically unchanged over the last 25 yr. Moreover , the energy intensity in material 
production has even increased further. These facts indicate the critical state of the Soviet 
energy system, which is reflected in the low energy-efficiency improvements over the last 
decades. 
USSR ENERGY-DEMAND AND SUPPLY PROSPECTS 
1990-2005 
The prospects for the Soviet energy-system development were defined in the Energy 
Program, adopted in 1982, in which the main directions for fuel and energy-complex 
development were stated up to the year 2000. This Program gave great importance to the 
production of NG, coal and nuclear energy and to energy conservation. Since then, the 
Program has been revised and , in the latest draft, the time frame was extended to include the 
period 2005-2010. t Due to the fact that the plans for nuclear-energy development between 
1980 and 1985 were not fulfilled and the installation of nuclear power plants after the 
Chernobyl accident slowed down (1986-1990), provisions have been made to compensate for 
the drop in nuclear electricity production primarily through the accelerated growth of the 
natural gas industry. This Program requires increased production of NG to meet heat 
t Economic and political uncertainties during the 1990s make it impossible to prepare a specified energy policy. The 
main trends of this policy are known and are being implemented in the current plans, although the economic crisis 
has affected the energy system, as well as other sectors of the national economy. 
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demands and cogeneration needs, while directing coal use to condensate-type power plants for 
electricity generation, which is dictated by ecological considerations. 
Central to the Energy Program is the policy of energy conservation. The Program envisages 
that intensive work will be done to improve the efficiency of energy use. A serious drawback to 
the country's economic structure is the higher material intensity compared to that of other 
industrially-developed countries. Improving the structure of the national economy and 
implementing intensive energy savings will allow effective use of the vast potential for energy 
conservation. t 
Electrification of the national economy will proceed rapidly and should promote the growth 
of labor productivity, thereby providing a basis for resolutions of many of the national social 
and economic problems. Conservation of primary energy resources is important, especially of 
premium hydrocarbon fuels . In the draft of the new program, special attention is devoted to 
the ecological aspects of energy-system developments. There is concern with the use of 
low-grade fossil fuels, in particular coal. Large investments are required to reduce negative 
impacts on the environment and human health. The ecological constraints are among the most 
important features of the new program.:j: 
The draft of the new Energy Program also stresses the importance of improving economic 
mechanisms for the energy sector itself with the goal of promoting the development of the 
energy industries on a self-supporting basis. 
The Program assumes that the improvement of the fuel and energy complex will be achieved 
in two stages. The first stage (up to the year 2000) will be characterized by a continuous growth 
in hydrocarbon production with small absolute growth in oil and NG-liquid. Large increases in 
NG production were achieved in the early 1980s, mainly by the Tyumen gas production and 
transportation to the European U.S.S.R. During the next period, efforts will be focused on 
radical improvements in nuclear safety and reducing the costs of nuclear energy. Furthermore, 
stable coal production will be achieved, mainly by using the open cast methods in the eastern 
parts of the country. 
In the second stage (first decade of the 21st century and perhaps beyond), efforts will be 
made toward achieving stable levels of hydrocarbon production to compensate for possible 
reductions in liquid fuel production by a further increase in NG production. Fossil fuel 
consumption growth at this stage will be reduced and met mainly by increased coal production. 
Energy conservation will possibly allow stabilization of nuclear energy growth. Options for 
economic developments without absolute energy-consumption growth are now being studied. 
But this transition to a new phase of energy development is likely to occur only beyond 2010. 
The main goals of the Energy Program (draft) were as follows: (i) improvement in labor 
productivity by a factor of 2.2-2.3 by 2000 as compared to the 1985 level, due to further growth 
of electricity use and mechanical power use per labor unit sustained a stabilized productivity 
growth is sought beyond 2000. (ii) Reduction in the energy/NMP ratio by a factor of 1.3-1.4 by 
2000 and thereafter by at least from 2.5 to 0.7%/yr, depending on the strategy, thereby 
achieving by 2010 a reduction of at least about 50% versus the 1985 level.§ (iii) Energy-
production growth without further growth of the labor force in the energy sector. (iv) Freezing 
specific investments per unit of primary energy produced to 2000. (v) High-grade energy 
supplies to the population. (vi) Air-pollution reduction by factors of 1.2 and 2.0 to 2000 and 
2010, respectively. 
All of these goals are quite impossible to achieve by following current trends. There are 
persistent needs for finding new concepts and approaches in order to solve national energy 
problems. 
tFor comparison, during the past 25 yr (1960-1985) , the GDP material intensity dropped by 20% in the U.S.A., 25% 
in Japan, 18% in the F.R.G ., and only 3.9% in the U.S.S.R. 
j: Up to now, the problem of global warming and possible abatement measures have not been seriously studied in the 
U.S.S.R. The importance of this issue is presently under investigation and the Energy Program will most likely be 
revised with consideration of this subject from a long-range perspective. 
§This goal now seems to be quite impossible to achieve because of the low activity in energy conservation and difficult 
economic situation in the U.S.S.R. in the late 1980s and early 1990s. Fulfillment of goals is pushed beyond 2010. 
The energy projections given below take this delay into account . 
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It may be most promising to follow a policy of enhanced energy conservation, which is the 
focus of the new Energy Program. According to some evaluations, structural changes in the 
productive system could provide only a 10-15% reduction in the energy/NMP ratio, which is 
equivalent to savings of 320 million tee in 2010 and 1.4-2.4 billion tee in 2020 compared to 
1990. The remaining changes are to be achieved by improvements in energy efficiency. The 
technical limits for energy conservation correspond to about 1000 million tee/yr in the case of 
full utilization of all known technologies, i.e., not less than one-half of total current energy 
consumption. 
Investments will be needed to implement energy savings measures. It is estimated that about 
200 million tee/yr could be saved without additional investments. The savings potential for a 2-
or 5-yr payback period (the latter is the highest permissible estimate for a payback period 
under free-market conditions) is equal to 450-650 million tee. With savings of up to 600 million 
tee, the required investments in energy savings are less than the direct average investments 
required for the primary energy-supply systems. 
The level of primary energy demand is heavily dependent on the economic outlook over the 
projected period. This essential factor remains very fuzzy because of uncertainties associated 
with the Soviet economy. The best approach is to consider a broad spectrum of possible 
alternatives: from the pessimistic view on economic recovery with a 2%-growth rate in the 
1990s to the optimistic concept based on a 3.5%-growth rate, compared to 4.5-5% in the 
official version of the Energy Program. In this study, it is assumed that the average annual 
growth in real terms will be about 2.5% and the energy /NMP ratio will decline by 1 % /yr. t 
Table 30 gives a description of the U.S.S.R. energy balance for the period 1990-2005. As a 
result of the energy-savings policy, primary energy consumption in the U .S.S.R. will increase 
only by a factor of 1.2 in 2005 as compared to 1990. Over the same time period, the real NMP 
will grow by a factor of 1.4-1.5. This means that the energy/NMP ratio will decline by almost 
15% to 2005 as compared to the 1990 level; it was expected earlier to decline by 20-25% . 
The NG industry will remain the most dynamic industry in the fuel and energy complex with 
its growth rate increasing by a factor of 1.35-1.38; the NG share in the production of all forms 
of energy will rise from 40% in 1990 to 47% in 2005. Natural gas production may reach 
1.1-1.2 trillion m3/yr in 2005. However, taking into account the permanent difficulties 
encountered in the coal industry and with nuclear energy, it is quite possible that this 
production level will be achieved even earlier. Until 2000-2010, NG will successfully compete 
with nuclear energy in the European part of the U .S.S.R. Beyond this time period, the 
situation remains quite uncertain . It is believed now that augmented use of NG in the country's 
energy balance will produce a "NG pause" for the next 10-15 or even 20 yr, which can be used 
to find ways of solving ecological problems arising from coal utilization and improving nuclear 
reactor designs to achieve improved safety and better economics. There will be many problems 
connected with NG production developments over the years to come, mainly of an ecological 
nature. It seems that these can be solved more effectively than problems associated with 
expanding production of other energy forms. 
During the 1990s, oil production is expected to stabilize and then to decrease . For a short 
period of time, liquid-fuel production may continue to grow because of expanding NG-liquid 
production. The oil share in the country's energy balance will decline from 35% currently to 
28-30% by 2005. An analysis of the situation shows that stabilization or even a slight growth of 
oil and NG-liquid production at a level of some 650 million tons annually after 2000 is 
technically feasible for the oil industry, although at a price. Instead, it appears expedient to 
have an absolute reduction in the oil-production levels beyond 1995-2000 by a few tens of 
million tons per year. This change will avoid the development of fields with very low 
productivity and to abandon the wide-scale use (at least for a couple of decades) of the most 
expensive new oil-production technologies. 
tin a recent study made by the Commission on the Development of Alternative Energy Scenarios of the U.S.S.R . 
Academy of Sciences, the rate of energy-intensity improvement is assumed to be 1.8-2.7%/yr to 2005, which seems 
to be too optimistic. During the last 15 yr this rate was 0.9%/yr on average (Ref. 13) . 
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Table 30. U.S.S.R. energy supply and demand for 1990 and 2005 in millions of tee 
(from Refs. 13-15). 
Activity Sol ids Liquids Gaseous Renew- luclear !lectri- Heat 
ables city TOTAL 
Priury energy 
production 1990 468 880 10l5 76 75 l5l4 
l005 540 830 1390 135 llO 1935 
Balance of trade 
1990 -30 -m -145 -430 
1005 -45 -m -180 -450 
Do1estic consu1pt-
ion 1990 438 625 880 76 75 -5 l089 
l005 495 605 lllO 135 120 -20 2545 
Electricity gene-
rat ion 1990 -168 -120 -315 -76 -75 212 211 -331 
2005 -250 -75 -m -115 -120 310 l60 -m 
Other energy sec-
tors 1990 -15 -35 -102 -58 -33 -w 
1005 -15 -40 -140 -80 -40 -315 
Katerials produc-
ti on 1990 155 168 287 101 134 845 
lOOl 170 100 330 Ill 160 845 
Transportation 
1990 m 11 13 l 198 
lOOl 215 15 20 llO 
Residential/ 
co11ercial 1990 90 40 115 35 4l 3ll 
l005 50 30 185 20 55 60 400 
Ron-energy use 
1990 10 90 50 150 
2005 10 145 95 250 
Final energy 
1990 155 470 463 149 178 1515 
2005 230 490 605 20 210 220 1795 
For the anticipated stabilization and even some reduction in oil production beyond 2000, top 
priority should be given to the rational use of petroleum products and to search for ways of 
decreasing crude-oil demand . In the early 1980s, motor-fuel yields in oil refining amounted to 
over 40% and nearly the same amount of fuel oil was produced. In the future, these ratios will 
change radically: motor-fuel yields will be up to 60-65% while fuel-oil yields decline to 
15-17%. There will also be a substantial increase in the share of feedstock for petrochemistry 
and non-fuel products. 
Changes will also occur in the pattern of petroleum-product consumption. Present crude-oil 
consumption for mobile units accounts for only 40%; in the future, it will rise to 65%. It will 
decline from 35 to 12% for heat and electricity production. Petroleum-product consumption 
will be strongly influenced by a shift to more economical vehicles, electrically-powered 
railways, public urban transport, and the use of compressed methane for a part of the intracity 
freight traffic. 
The country's oil-refining industry will enhance its productivity by using thermocatalytic 
refining processes and fuel-oil hydrogenization with methane-based hydrogen . Great impor-
tance is attached to the production of lead-free gasoline and low-sulfur diesel fuel to reduce 
ecological problems in the big cities. It is expected that by 2010, the total capacity for fuel-oil 
processing will have been increased three-fold compared to 1985 and the extent of oil refining 
by a factor of 1.5 to reach 87-90%. This is a substantial change in the pattern of 
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petroleum-product utilization and implies a 30-35% reduction in crude-oil consumption due to 
fuel-oil processing. 
Coal production will slowly grow to 540-550 million tee in 2005, as the result of the 
development of coal deposits located in the eastern part of the U.S.S.R. (Kuznetsk, 
Kansk-Achinsk, and Ekibastuz basins). Coal production in the European part will reach a 
stable level before 2000 and will decline thereafter. The large-scale users in eastern Siberia and 
Kazakhstan (power plants, iron and steel factories, cement works, etc.) consume local solid 
fuels, which are cheaper than nuclear energy. For environmental reasons, the use of coal will 
be limited in these regions and, where possible, it will be replaced by NG. In western Siberia 
and central Asia, because of the local unstable seismology and high capital costs for nuclear 
power plants, Siberian coal will remain competitive with nuclear energy but probably not with 
NG during the period up to 2010-2020. Coal production will increase very slowly during the 
next few decades because of ecological and social constraints . In order to limit C02 production, 
coal use could decline after 2005-2010. 
Because of serious difficulties encountered by the nuclear industry, only moderate growth 
rates are expected during the next decade. The nuclear share in primary energy production will 
increase from 3% in 1990 to 4-4.2 by 2005, which is much lower than was previously predicted. 
Nevertheless, electricity generation by nuclear power plants will almost double by 2005 and 
increase steadily thereafter. 
The hydroelectricity potential of the European part will be fully utilized by 2010 and that of 
the Eastern part by 2040. Unconventional renewable energy sources are likely to play a 
noticeable role only well after 2000. We expect to see 10-20 million tee/yr of renewable 
energies to meet thermal energy needs in the residential and commercial sectors by 2005-2010. 
The total contributions from nuclear, hydroelectric and renewable sources will amount to 
250- 260 million tee annually in 2005; thus, their total fractional share to primary energy 
production will not exceed 8-9%. 
The final energy consumption will increase by 18-20% by 2005, whereas the increases in 
material production will be only 6-8%, in transportation 26-30%, and in the residential and 
commercial sectors 25%. As a result of these differences in growth rates, the fractional share of 
energy use for material production will decrease from 56 to 50% while those for the other 
activities will remain practically the same. This slow restructuring will have the positive effect 
of industry maintaining the lead role. By contrast, in more energy-effective economies, such as 
U.S., industry, agriculture and construction accounts for less than one-third of total energy use; 
in Western Europe, they account for less than 40% while the residential and commercial 
sectors account for 60% . 
With the initiation in the early 1920s of the GOERLO Plan (the first Soviet plan for 
electrification of the national economy), electrificationt has increased and will continue in an 
upward trend, rising from 10 to 12% by 2005. 
Soviet energy policy envisions continuing energy-export growth especially for NG and coal, 
with nearly stable export of oil and oil products. During the past decades , energy export has 
played an important role in the U.S .S.R. economy. The need to pay for foreign trade 
expenditures has required large energy exports, especially of hydrocarbons . In 1986, the net 
exports were 396 million tee of the total available energy resources of 2536 million tee and thus 
· accounted for more than 15%. During the past 25 yr, exports of hydrocarbon fuels have 
increased as follows: in 1986, oil exports amounted to 21.1% of the oil produced vs 12.1% in 
1960; the corresponding gas exports were 11.5 and 0.5%, respectively . In 1986, oil exports to 
capitalist and socialist countries were 130 million tons, oil products 60 million tons and gas 
almost 80 billion m3• These sales brought 65% of the total hard-currency income, which is 
urgently required to strengthen the U .S.S.R. economy. The present Program requires 
improving the ecological situation in big industrial cities of the country by reducing the amounts 
of hazardous pollutants emitted by power-generating units by a factor of 1.5 by 2000 and more 
than two-fold over the succeeding decade. 
t Measured as the share of final energy consumption for electrification. 
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2005-2030 
The energy sector is one of the main sources of anthropogenic C02 emission and also of 
C"4. In order to mitigate possible global warming, it is essential to reduce fossil-fuel use. The 
greenhouse effect is a global problem and must be treated at the international level. 
Recommendations for U.S.S.R. energy policy should be based on global projections. This 
position is reflected in the documents on the State Program concerning sustainable long-term 
economic development in view of global climate change. The following issues are expected to 
be analyzed: (i) social and economic assessments of the efficiency of conservation measures; 
(ii) prospects for the replacement of fossil fuels with high C02 emission (coal, oil) by NG; 
(iii) improved safety for nuclear energy use; (iv) prospects for effective utilization of 
renewables; (v) technologies for C02 disposal. 
The first projections for Soviet energy development to 2030 have recently been issued. 13•14 
Several scenarios for social and economic developments are considered in this study with 
different rates for economic restructuring and efficiency improvements. According to these 
scenarios, energy demand in the U.S.S.R. may reach 2500-3600 million tee in 2030, 
depending on the extent of economic activity. The following three scenarios are chosen: (i) a 
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Table 31. Estimated percentage distribution for energy use in 1990, 2005 and 2030. 
2030 
Sector 1990 2005 Moderate Enhanced 20%-COi 
scenario scenario reduction 
scenario 
material production 55 50 48 45 35 
transportation 13 14 15 17 20 
residential and 
commercial use 21 22 23 24 28 
other uses 11 14 14 14 17 
Table 32. Energy supplies for the domestic sector in percent. 
2030 
Energy Sources 1990 2005 Moderate Enhanced 20%-COi 
scenario scenario reduction 
scenario 
solids 21 19 24 18 6 
liquids 30 24 19 20 15 
gaseous 42 47 43 50 49 
renewables 3 . 6 5 6 6 18 
nuclear 3.4 5 8 6 12 
moderate scenairo with some improvements in economic restructuring and energy conservation; 
(ii) an enhanced scenairo with large improvements and the aim of stabilizing primary energy 
consumption after 2005-2010; (iii) a 20% C02 reduction scenario compared to 1990. 
These scenarios deal with three important cases, namely, business-as-usual with moderate 
dynamics of improvements in the economic and energy systems, an energy-stabilization 
scenario, and a C02-reduction scenario after 2005-2010. The last two scenarios are expected to 
have a profound impact on the national economic system and could lower economic growth 
rates to 2005-2010. However , less energy-intensive systems may ultimately result in an 
improved economy. 
Scenario elaboration requires careful attention to energy requirements for different 
energy-consuming sectors. Also account must be taken of social and economic goals. Estimates 
of energy reserves and resources, as well as of state-of-the-art production systems, must be 
used. 
Figures 2 and 3 show the final and primary energy demands for 2030. As it could be seen, the 
scenarios differ substantially in the levels of energy consumption and energy-system structure. 
For the moderate scenario, the primary energy consumption is expected to grow by a factor of 
1.2 compared to 2005 and by more than 1.5 compared to 1990. For the other two scenarios , 
stabilization of energy consumption is reached after 2005-2010. t 
Due to increased electrification and large improvements in the efficiency of electricity 
generation, the final to primary energy ratio will steadily decline: from 72% in 1990 to 70% in 
2005 and further to 67% for the moderate and enhanced scenarios and to 57% for the 20% C02 
reduction scenario. The final structure for energy use is summarized in Table 31. 
The changes in domestic primary energy consumption are summarized in Table 32. 
The three scenarios are closely related to the capital investments made for the energy sector 
during the period 1990-2030. Table 33 contains estimates of the required capital investments. 
For the moderate scenario, required investments during 1990-2030 are almost 6.5% of the total 
national income produced within this time period. For the enhanced scenario, 6.9% are needed. 
For the 20% C02 reduction scenario , required additional expenses are 9-10% of the total 
t Soon after 2005, weak growth of primary energy consumption is assumed, which diminishes and becomes negative 
after 2010-2015 . Around 2020, the same level of energy consumption is projected as for 2005. 
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Table 33. Approximate capital investments in the energy sector (1990-2030) in billions of 
roubles. 
Energy Sector Moderate Enhanced 20% C02 Reduction 
scenario scenario scenario 
coal 125 95 65 
oil production 650 590 540 
oil refining 75 70 60 
gas production 280 280 275 
gas transport 700 700 685 
electricity, total 875 1065 2330 
fossil 145 160 150 
renewables 275 410 1190 
nuclear 165 135 215 
electr.transport 290 350 775 
energy conservation 595 1150 925 
Total 3300 3940 4880 
% of the national 6.3 6.9 9.3 
income 
Assumed fuel costs: coal= 100 rbl/tce, oil= 210 rbl/tce (300 rbl/t), oil refining= 25 rbl/tce 
(30 rbl/t), natural gas= 60 rbl/tce (70 rbl/1000 m3), natural gas transportation and 
distribution= 250% of natural gas production, thermal power plants= 250 rbl/kWe 
(lifetime= 20 yr), renewables = 1000 rbl/kWe (lifetime= 10 yr), nuclear= 1000 rbl/kWe 
(lifetime= 20 yr), electricity lines= 50% of electricity generation, energy conservation: 
moderate scenario= 150 rbl/tce; enhanced and 20% C02 reduction scenarios= 
200 rbl/tce. 
national income, which is hardly possible. The capital investments for developed countries are 
typically 5-6%. Consequently, energy-system development in the U.S.S.R. may lead to large 
financial difficulties. 
A summary of energy projections is given in Table 34. During the next 40 yr, the energy 
intensity will decline by a factor of 2-3 compared to the 1990 level. This energy efficiency 
improvement will occur in two stages: 1990-2005 when the rate of decline will be only about 
Table 34. Features of U.S.S.R. energy scenarios. 
1990 2005 2030 
Features Moderate Enhanced 20% C02 
scenario scenario reduction 
scenario 
Population, 289 320 355 355 355 
millions 
National income, 
10' rbl. (1990) 655 950 2300 2650 2300 
% growth 2.5 3 3.5 3.5 
Primary energy, 
10 • tee 2089 2545 3260 2600 2600 
tee/cap. 7.2 7.7 9.3 7.4 7.4 
Electricity 1725 2500 3700 3500 5000 
production , TWh 
Energy intensity, 
tce/10' rbl 3 .14 2 . 68 1.42 0.98 1.13 
Electricity inten-
sity , kWh/rbl 2 . 65 2 . 63 1. 61 1. 32 2.17 
Energy savings to 
1990, 10• tee - 440 3960 5720 4620 
C02, 10• t/yr 4070 4690 5890 4585 3265 
% change from 1990 115 145 113 80 
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1 %/yr according to our projections because of system inertia and economic problems. After 
2005, the energy intensity decline could be 3-4%/yr. Per capita energy consumption will 
continue to increase from 7.2 to 7.4 to 9.3 tee. The energy savings by 2030 are impressive: 55% 
for the moderate scenario and more than 65-70% for the other two scenarios. 
Implementation of the scenarios requires the following: (i) decentralization and privatization 
of the large energy-supply systems and introduction of a market economy concept in the enc;1gy 
sector; (ii) changes in the energy-pricing system with allowance for social costs; 
(iii) introduction of competition into the energy-supply and demand systems; (iv) changes in 
investment policy with greater emphasis on energy savings and conservation rather than on 
energy production; (v) conversion of the military industries; (vi) conditions for the expansion 
of western capital investments in the U.S.S.R.; (vii) R&D collaboration with Western partners 
in high priority areas such as energy savings, power-plant modernizations, research and 
development on joint European electricity and NG supply grids, access to research, student 
and specialist exchanges; (viii) time to assess and improve the new energy policy. 
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